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COMMENTS 
INHERITANCE TAXATION-SELECTED PROVISIONS OF MICHIGAN, 
ILLINOIS AND OHio-A STUDY IN .APPLICATION AND JusTIFICATION-
If there is one guiding principle in the field of state death tax-
ation it is the acknowledgment that the tax is not on property but 
is in nature an excise or privilege tax. Inasmuch as the ability 
to transmit or receive property through devise or descent is a 
statutory privilege and not a natural right, it is a proper subject 
of taxation.1 This is true even though the value of the property 
passing from the decedent is used to measure the tax.2 Thus, 
the state has broad power in determining both the form of taxation 
and the existence of any allowance of preferential treatment 
among beneficiaries. · 
Generally the form of the tax will take one of two approaches. 
An "inheritance" tax may be imposed upon the beneficiary's 
right to receive the decedent's property, or an "estate" tax may be 
levied against the estate because of the decedent's privilege of 
transmitting his property, either by will or intestate succession.8 
Michigan, Illinois and Ohio, similarly situated from an economic 
and geographic standpoint, selected the inheritance tax, substan-
tially modeling the forerunners of their present-day statutes after 
an earlier New York law.4 In addition, the respective state courts 
have felt somewhat committed to accept as strong precedent prior 
1 "The laws of descent and devise being the creation of the statute law, the power 
which creates may regulate and may impose conditions or ,burdens on a right of suc-
cession .... " Kochersperger v. Dra:ke, 167 Ill. 122 at 125, 47 N.E. 321 (1897). Cf. Estate 
of Ogg, 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W. (2d) 175 (1952). 
2 In re Fish's Estate, 219 .Mich. 369, 189 N.W. 177 (1922). 
s Thirty-seven states have chosen to adopt an in:heritance tax, ten states an estate tax, 
one state both, and one state imposes no death tax at all. See 4 CCH INHERITANCE, 
EsrATE AND GIFr TAX REP., 7th ed., 1[1100. Usually accompanying either form is a:n 
"additional tax" to absorb the credit against the federal estate tax allowed by I.R.C., 
§2011. For development of this additional tax, see Cogburn, "The Credit Allowable 
Against the Basic Federal Estate Tax for Death Taxes Paid to State Statutes Enacted 
To Take Advantage Thereof-Constitutional Difficulty and Some Suggested Solutions," 
30 N.C. L. REv. 123 at 130 (1952). 
4 In 1885 New York adopted what basically, with amendments, was to remain its 
inheritance tax laws. N.Y. Laws (1885) c. 483. However, ,the inheritance tax was repealed 
in New York in 1930 a:nd an estate tax was enacted. N.Y. Laws (1930) c. 710. The statute 
copied almost verbatim the federal estate tax as it stood in 1926, a:nd the New York 
provisions ,have been amended numerous times to keep up with changes in the federal 
law. See Kassell, "Introduction to the Tax Law of New York," 59 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1954) p. IX. 
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judicial interpretations of the New York legislation. 5 One might 
accordingly expect to find the death tax law of the three states 
virtually identical. Because of statutory amendments, court deci-
sions, and administrative practices, however, there is today con-
siderable variation. 
This comment will explore the existing variations in four 
commonly encountered areas: joint interests with rights of sur-
vivorship, contingent remainder interests, powers of appointment, 
and life insurance proceeds. Emphasis will also be placed on treat-
ment accorded the surviving spouse and children and the implicit 
relationship between such treatment and some of the above 
areas. The essence of this examination will be to inquire whether 
adoption of an estate tax would be a more suitable vehicle for 
implementing a local death tax program. 
I. Policy Toward the Family 
At the outset it should be recognized that although the 
motives of death tax legislation may be influenced by ideas of 
social reform and redistribution of wealth, the predominant pur-
pose today is to raise revenue.6 All three states, however, show a 
definite pattern of favoring certain beneficiaries, particularly the 
spouse and children of the decedent.7 Evidence of this policy 
may be seen in the tax rates and exemptions applicable to such 
beneficiaries and the taxation of the dower interest. 
A. Rates and Exemptions. In each state, beneficiaries are 
divided into various classes depending upon their degree of blood 
or marital relationship to the decedent. The classes are taxed 
at different and progressive rates, the rates applicable to spouses 
and children generally being lower than rates on other relatives 
and strangers in blood.8 Further, exemptions of various amounts 
are given to some of the classes, the highest exemptions going to 
the class in which the ·wife and children are found. Illinois gives 
5 E.g., People v. Carpenter, 264 Ill. 400 at 405, 106 N.E. 302 (1914); In re Stanton's 
Estate, 142 Mich. 491 at 495, 105 N.W. 1122 (1905); Wellman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 107 
Ohio St. 267 at 276, 140 N.E. 104 (1923). 
6 See Oakes, "Development of American State Death Taxes," 26 IOWA L. REv. 451 
at 460, 463 (1941). 
7 Also favored are charities, bequests to which are exempt from taxation. Ill. Rev. 
Stat. (1957) c. 120, §401; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Mason's Supp. 1956) §205.201; Ohio 
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.09. 
s Undoubtedly one underlying purpose behind such differentiation is to encourage 
the disposition of property to these beneficiaries. 
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these parties an additional tax advantage by, in effect, taking the 
exemption off the top of the progressive rate scale. Michigan shows 
its additional favoritism by taxing real estate left to the wife, 
children and certain relatives at only three-fourths the regular 
rate.9 
B. Dower. While statutes in each of the three states specifically 
grant dower,1° there is no provision explicitly taxing this interest, 
which, in many instances, is of considerable value. However, a 
clause is found in the tax statutes of each state reading somewhat 
as follows: 
A tax is hereby imposed upon the transfer ·of [or succession to] 
any property or of any interest therein: (1) when the transfer 
[ or succession] is by will or by the intestate laws of this state.11 
The Ohio courts decided that, under strict property theory, the 
wife's dower interest was a right accruing 'f?y operation of law as 
a result of the marriage rather than an interest received from her 
husband by succession and was not, therefore, subject to the 
inheritance tax.12 The Supreme Court of Illinois took a different 
view. It held that, inasmuch as there were no laws in Illinois 
specifically designated as "intestate laws," the clause in question 
must refer to all laws governing intestate devolutions, including 
the dower law which governs, regulates and controls the interest 
which the widow receives.13 The Michigan Supreme Court has 
as yet not been presented with this issue. But in two non-tax 
cases this court defined the dower interest in property terms very 
similar to those used by the Ohio court.14 Some writers have 
seized upon this as authority that dower is not taxable in Michi-
gan.15 Yet the State Revenue Department takes a contrary view 
and continues to levy a tax upon the wife's receipt of this interest. 
9 See generally, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 120, §375; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.202; 
Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §§5731.09, 5731.12. 
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 3, §170; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §558.1; Ohio Rev. Code 
(Baldwin, 1958) §2103.02. 
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 120, §375; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.201; Ohio Rev. 
Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.02. 
12 Tax Commission v. Reeves, 11 Ohio Abs. 154 (1931), rehear. den. 11 Ohio Abs. 
574 (1931). 
13 Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 N.E. 798 (1901), affd. 188 U.S. 97 (1903). 
14Needham v. Belote, 39 Mich. 487 (1878); Cummings v. Schreur, 239 Mich. 178 at 
182, 214 N.W. 199 (1927). 
15 Dexter, "The Michigan Inheritance and Estate Tax-Legal and Constitutional 
Aspects in Light of Other Death Duties,'' 27 MICH. ST. B. J. 12 at 13 (August 1948); 13 
CALLAGHAN'S MICHIGAN PLEADING AND PRACTICE §108.07 (1948). 
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If presented with the question today, the Michigan court might 
be somewhat influenced by a New York decision not many years 
after Michigan copied the New York law, interpreting that state's 
inheritance tax statute as not requiring taxation of a dower 
interest.16 
C. Comment. There seems to be no real objection in the 
three states to providing more favorable tax treatment for certain 
beneficiaries. The problem lies in determining the best method of 
accomplishing it. Under the estate tax approach, the tax rates on 
all beneficiaries are the same, with the spouse getting favored 
treatment through a marital deduction.17 Not only could the 
present policy of favoring the spouse be retained under an estate 
tax scheme, but that of favoring the children could be continued 
through creation of a filial deduction similar to the marital deduc-
tion. An estate tax would resolve the argument over the proper 
status of dower in the inheritance tax structure, through inclusion 
in the gross estate of all the assets of the decedent. And to the extent 
that a marital deduction is enjoyed under an estate tax plan, there 
is not much need for a dower exemption. While the dower prob-
lem could also be remedied by a clarifying amendment to the 
present tax statutes, it would seem that a more uniform program 
for benefiting the spouse could be worked out under an estate 
tax structure. 
IL Joint Interests with Rights of Survivorship 
When, upon the death of one of two persons holding property 
jointly with rights of survivorship, the other party becomes sole 
owner a logical reaction might be that a taxable event has occurred. 
This is not necessarily the result, however, under the existing 
laws. 
A. Michigan. The Michigan statute has remained consistently 
silent on the taxation of the survivor's rights in joint property. 
Although it could be argued that a creation of joint tenancy is a 
"transfer ... intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment 
at or after death"18 and thus taxable under the statute, this would 
be acceptable only if the deceased joint tenant were the grantor 
16 In re Weiler's Estate, 122 N.Y.S. 608 (1910), affd. 139 App. Div. 905, 124 N.Y.S. 
1133 (1910) (dower not subject to inheritance tax). 
17 See I.R.C., §2056; 59 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §249-s(4). New York also 
grants exemptions to the spouse and children. Id., §249-q. 
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.201. 
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or donor of the property.19 Certainly a taxable transfer would 
prospectively occur where the decedent, in contemplation of his 
death, created the joint tenancy between himself and another.20 
But often the tenancy results from the purchasing of property 
in joint names from a third party. In this situation, imposition 
of a tax would have to be justified under the statutory provision 
taxing transfers of property by will or under the intestate laws of 
the state.21 The Attorney General of Michigan early advised the 
state examiners that there was no authority under any of the 
statutory provisions giving them the right to impose a tax under 
this provision.22 This opinion was influenced by prior judicial 
interpretations of the parent New York legislation to the effect 
that, since both tenants were vested and seized of the whole estate 
under the instrument creating the tenancy, no additional interest 
was acquired by survivorship and no tax was due.23 
Nevertheless, the question was apparently unsettled in Michi-
gan as late as 1953, as the Michigan Department of Revenue, 
bolstered by an unpublished opinion of the state attorney general 
rendered that year,24 sought to levy an inheritance tax upon the 
survivor's right to the proceeds of a joint bank account originally 
created by the decedent. Furnished with the opportunity to pass 
upon this problem for the first time, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that estates by the entirety and joint estates with full right 
of survivorship are not taxable as transfers intending to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death because there 
is no transf er.25 Finding as a general rule of inheritance law 
19 Two early Michigan attorney general's op1mons suggested application of the 
inheritance tax upon the death of the husband where the husband previously put his 
own property into his and his wife's name. MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 338 (1923-24); 
MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 77 (1925-26). The Michigan court, however, has since 
held to the contrary. See note 25 infra. 
20 In re Potter's Estate, 351 Mich. 326, 88 N.W. (2d) 452 (1958), reaffirmed 355 Mich. 
403, 94 N.W. (2d) 813 (1959). 
21 See note 11 supra. 
22MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 72 (1921-22). 
23 Matter of McKelway, 221 N.Y. 15, 116 N:E. 348 (1917), interpreting Matter of 
Klatzl, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181 (1915). In 1915, the New York statute was amended 
specifically to impose a tax in instances where intangible property was held in joint 
names or similarly deposited in banks. New York Laws (1915) c. 664. This provision was 
later amended to cover all property subject to the inheritance tax. New York Laws (1925) 
C. 143. 
24 See Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 338 Mich. 347, Appellee Brief 48 (1953); 
id., Appellant Reply Brief 18. 
25 In re Renz' Estate, 338 Mich. 347, 61 N.W. (2d) 148 (1953). The court expressly 
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that an estate in possession is an estate in present enjoyment, 
the court decided that the joint property becomes the property 
of the survivor not by descent, distribution, or transfer, but simply 
by right of survivorship. Thus, the Michigan court exhibited 
an inclination to follow strict property law, rather than further 
the general notion of "completeness" implied in general tax legis-
lation. As a result of this decision, the Michigan Department 
of Revenue officially reversed its stand in this area26 and resolved 
the issue for all practical purposes. 
B. Illinois. This state avoided the overall interpretative prob-
lem faced in Michigan by the passage in 1919 of an amendment 
expressly taxing the acquisition of property by survivorship, spe-
cifically including joint bank accounts payable to either the 
depositor or survivor.27 This provision did not, however, resolve 
a further problem. If property was purchased in joint names with 
rights of survivorship and one joint tenant supplied more of 
the purchase price than the other, how much of the property 
should be used as a basis for taxing th~ survivor? The Illinois 
statute read, in part, as follows: 
" ... [T]he right of the surviving joint tenant ... to the im-
mediate ownership . . . of such property shall be deemed a 
transfer ... in the same manner as though the whole property 
. . . was owned by said parties as tenants in common and 
had been bequeathed to the surviving joint tenant ... by such 
deceased joint tenant ... by will." 
In a case arising under this provision where a mother paid 
one-third and a daughter two-thirds of the consideration for 
corporate stock taken jointly, the Illinois Supreme Court decided 
that the statute as ·written imposed a tax only on the contributive 
share of the decedent. Thus it held the surviving daughter tax-
able only on one-third the value of the property.28 In answer 
to the argument that the legislative intent was to tax one-half 
adopted earlier opinions by the attorney general as well as New York precedent. See also 
KIDDER, STATE INHERITANCE TAX AND TAXABILITY OF TRUSTS 114 (1934). 
26 Mich. Dept. Rev. Ruling Gan. 22, 1954) CCH INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX 
REP., 7th ed., 1[18,135. But the department refused to acquiesce in the nontaxability of 
jointly held government bonds "payable on death" because of the unsettled property 
law interpretations on the rights of the named payees. See In re De Waters' Estate, 338 
Mich. 457, 61 N.W. (2d) 779 (1953), where the court -was equally divided. 
27 Ill. Laws (1919) p. 757 at 758. 
28 People v. Varel, 351 Ill. 96, 184 N.E. 209 (1932). 
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the property, the court responded that if the legislature meant 
one-half, it should have used language which clearly stated that 
position.29 
Apparently taking the court at its word, the legislature clari-
fied its policy by amending the statute to read that the tax 
should be computed by dividing the number of joint tenants 
into the value of the property with the resulting amount deemed 
bequeathed by the deceased joint tenant to the survivor(s) by 
will.30 According to one state official, the amendment merely 
restated the law as it had been construed and enforced prior to 
the supreme court decision. 31 
C. Ohio. Unlike Michigan or Illinois, Ohio from the outset 
of its revised inheritance tax policy adopted an express provision 
taxing jointly-held property.32 This provision stated broadly: 
"Whenever property is held by two or more persons jointly, 
so that upon the death of one of them the survivor has a 
right to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoy-
ment of the whole property, the accrual of such right by the 
death of one of them shall be deemed a succession taxable 
under this section, in the same manner as if the enhanced 
value of the whole property belonged absolutely to the 
deceased person, and he had bequeathed the same to the 
. b ·11 "33 survivor y w1 . . . . 
Clearly and purposefully drawn, this provision was apparently 
meant to eliminate the problem regarding the amount of sur-
vivorship property subject to tax, for it plainly said all such 
property was to be taxed. Nevertheless, it created a new ambi-
guity. What was meant by jointly held property? Ohio law did 
not recognize the common law joint tenancy although it did 
recognize the contractual validity of a survivorship provision 
in a deed. Thus a grant of real estate to "A and B and to the 
survivor of them" created in Ohio a tenancy in common with a 
.. _contingent remainder in fee to the survivor. Early attorney 
29 Id. at 104. 
30 Ill. Laws (1933) p. 889 at 890; now Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 120, §375. 
31 KERNER, ATIORNEY GENERAL REGULATIONS IN RE IU.INOIS INHERITANCE TAX AND 
PROCEDURE 4 (1934), cited in comment, 32 Iu.. L. REv. 57 at 69, n. 92 (1937). 
32 The provision was modeled after New York legislation enacted four years earlier, 
although •broadened to encompass all property and not just intangibles. I OHIO ATIY. 
GEN. OP. 473 at 478 (1920). Cf. note 23 supra. 
33 Now Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.02. 
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general opm1ons stated that the tax provision applied only to 
common law joint tenancies and that, since none existed in 
Ohio, the legislative intent was to limit its coverage to property 
located in Ohio but owned by out-of-state persons whose state 
did recognize joint tenancies.34 
This advice, however, did not withstand the test of later 
reflection. In 1929 the Ohio Supreme Court modified the attor-
ney general's interpretation in the area of joint bank accounts 
with right of survivorship contracts. Since either party had the 
right to withdraw any amount up to the whole deposit prior 
to his death, the death of one was said to create a new right in 
the other, i.e., an exclusive right to the entire fund, and this 
right was held properly subject to taxation.35 Finally in 1941, 
the attorney general flatly rejected the previous opinions of his 
office and ruled that a statute taxing jointly held property, passed 
almost a century after Ohio courts had said technical joint ten-
ancies did not exist in that state, could not have been meant 
to exclude the Ohio citizen. On the contrary, it was enacted 
to prevent circumvention of the inheritance tax through the 
creation of survivorship agreements.36 
While the provision, as quoted above, indicated the tax was 
to be applied as if the deceased tenant owned all the property 
in the joint estate, statutory language was disregarded in prac-
tice. Possibly it was felt unfair to tax the surviving tenant on the 
value of the whole property if he had in fact originally con-
tributed a portion of the purchase price. In its 1929 decision37 
the Ohio Supreme Court suggested and applied a tax on only 
the decedent's contributive share. The solution worked out by 
the Ohio Department of Taxation was to levy on the full value 
of the property pursuant to the statute, but allow the survivor 
to raise the question of contribution in the probate court and 
carry the burden of proof.38 This apparently remains the law 
of Ohio with one major exception: the provision in question 
was amended in 1957 to presume conclusively a taxable sue-
34 1 Omo ATIY. GEN. OP. 473 at 479 (1920); 2 Omo ArrY. GEN. OP. 1001 (1922). 
35 Tax Commission v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E. 352 (1929). 
36 Omo A'ITY. GEN. OP. 164 (1941). 
37 Note 35 supra. 
38Letter, Tax Dept., dated Nov. 1, 1940, referred to in 3 CCH INHERITANCE, EsrATE 
AND GIFr TAX REP., 7th ed., Omo 1[1570. 
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cession of only one-half the value of the property whenever 
title was held jointly by husband and wife.39 
D. Comment. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the principal function of survivorship rights is the alteration of 
property interests in a certain manner upon the occasion of 
death. Thus it would seem that survivorship interests have a 
place within the general framework and purpose of death tax 
legislation. It appears unwarranted to apply strict property prin-
ciples created in a non-tax setting in determining whether these 
interests are the proper subject of taxation. There is apparently 
no consistent policy among these three states with regard to tax 
treatment of survivorship interests. Whenever the survivor 
receives tax-free an amount exceeding his proportionate contri-
bution, some form of discrimination exists. Since survivorship 
interests are most commonly created between spouses, the Ohio 
statute, which conclusively presumes a one-half contribution by 
the surviving spouse, may be justified in light of the acknowl-
edged policy favoring such person. The Illinois provision, how-
ever, in conclusively presuming a contribution equal to the 
survivor's fractional share in all cases, can apparently be justified 
only on grounds of administrative convenience. Moreover, Mich-
igan's refusal to levy any tax on the survivor can be supported 
only on strict property analysis. 
The only appropriate way to tax in this area is through 
application of the proportionate contribution rule. While this 
method could be worked out within an inheritance tax scheme, 
it is the method used under the federal40 and New York41 estate 
tax structures. If an estate tax were to be adopted, uniform 
benefits to surviving spouses could be provided through opera-
tion of the marital deduction or through an increased exemption. 
III. Contingent Remainder Interests 
Since the nature of an inheritance tax is to measure the 
levy by the share each legatee or heir receives, a difficult problem 
39 127 OHIO LAWS (1957) p. 102. In 1951, the Department of Taxation began to employ 
a presumption of equal contribution whenever survivorship property was owned by 
husband and wife. However, this practice was abandoned four years later when it was 
discovered that the surviving husband much too often ignored the presumption and 
claimed full contribution. Tax Dept. Prob. Ct. Bul. No. 8 (July 8, 1955), CCH INHERITANCE, 
EsTATE AND GIFT TAX REP., 7th ed., 1fl8,459. 
40 I.R.C., §2040. 
4159 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §249-r(5). 
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is presented when the gift is one of a contingent remainder. The 
recipient of such interest may never acquire enjoyment or pos-
session of the estate, and yet the property (in the normal case) 
belonged to the decedent at his death and should be amenable 
to tax under some provision in the statutory scheme. 
Valuation is generally not difficult where the remainder is 
indefeasibly vested, and so it is not unreasonable to find in Illi-
nois, Michigan and Ohio that the tax on such interest is due 
immediately even though possession and enjoyment are post-
poned.42 The first hint of difficulty comes when the remainder is 
vested but subject to defeasance. The Ohio courts prefer to treat 
this as any other vested remainder but allow for a refund if 
necessary,43 while in Illinois it is taxed under the rules applicable 
to contingent remainders.44 In Michigan there is no problem, 
for, by statute, any vested remainderman may elect to defer pay-
ment of the tax until he should come into possession.45 
As might be expected, the Michigan, Illinois and Ohio treat-
ments of the problem arising with contingent remainders differ 
markedly. Basically, this is because each state adopted the New 
York legislation in different years and either failed to keep up 
with New York amendments or added embellishments of its 
own. 
A. Michigan. The original New York legislation of 1885, 
providing for no taxation until and unless the contingency 
occurred, was taken over by Michigan without the corresponding 
adoption of later New York amendments.46 The result, of course, 
is of great benefit to remaindermen, many of whom might attempt 
to evade the tax by not reporting the vesting of their interests. 
The burden is not on them to pay a tax and then apply for refund. 
Rather it is on the state to enforce payment as each contingency 
occurs. While this is one state's answer to the problem, it is 
hard to say whether the loss in tax revenue or the cost of vigilance 
is more expensive. 
B. Illinois. Under provisions similar to the original New 
42Ayers v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 187 Ill. 42, 58 N.E. 318 (1900); Tax Com-
mission v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 141 N:E. 678 (1923); MrcH. ATTY. GEN. REP. 84 (1902). 
43 Tax Commission v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 141 N.E. 678 (1923). 
44 People v. Donohue, 276 III. 88, 114 N.E. 513 (1916). 
45 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.207. 
46 See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.203. For New York amendments, see notes 48 
and 53 infra, and accompanying texts. 
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York and Michigan acts, the tax authorities in Illinois attempted 
to tax contingent remainder interests immediately upon the 
decedent's death. This position was soon held untenable by 
the Illinois courts since contingent remaindermen could not be 
considered "identifiable" for purposes of tax until the condition 
precedent occurred.47 In 1909, the statute was amended to tax 
contingent estates at the highest rate possible, i.e., to tax as if 
the estate had vested immediately in the remainderman who 
would have to pay the highest tax.48 If the tax later proved to be 
excessive, a refund would be allowed. Although this shifted the 
burden of vigilance to the ultimate vested remainderman, the 
Illinois procedure proved to be quite harsh in application49 and 
led to another amendment in 1929 permitting the local judge 
to fix a tentative tax on the likely result of the contingency if 
the executor so requests.50 This tax is paid out of the estate 
along with a• deposit to secure, until the remainder vests, the 
difference between the tentative tax and the tax under the highest 
rate possible. The income from the securities on deposit accrues 
to the estate. The 1929 amendment was repealed in 1933,51 but 
was substantially re-enacted in 1945.52 
C. 0 hio. In Ohio the executor of an estate has an election 
between two taxes.53 The tax is normally assessed at the highest 
47 Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 N.'E. 798 (1901), affd. 188 U.S. 97 (1903). 
48 Ill. Laws (1909), p. 311 at 320, now Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 120, §398. This copied 
an earlier New York amendment. N.Y. Laws (1899) c. 76. 
49 In one case where the decedent created a life estate with the remainder to be 
divided among any of forty-one nephews or nieces who survived the life tenant, the tax 
on the remainder was immedately assessed as though all but one of the remaindermen 
died before the life tenant, thus computing the tax on the full remainder interest in 
order to apply a higher progressive rate while allowing only one exemption. People v. 
Freese, 267 Ill. 164, 107 N.E. 857 (1915). See also People v. Linn, 357 Ill. 220, 191 N.E. 
450 (1934), and People v. Hulburd, 327 Ill. 72, 158 N.E. 373 (1927). 
50 Ill. Laws (1929) p. 613 at 615. 
51 Ill. Laws (1933) p. 889. 
52 Ill. Laws (1945) p. 1239 at 1240. The amount of ·the required deposit was set at 
150% of the difference between the two taxes. 
53 Under New York's inheritance tax statutes of 1885, no tax was collected until the 
contingency occurred and the courts refused to allow a deposit to be collected in the 
interim. This method apparently proved undesirable, and the statutes were amended in 
1899 (see note 48 supra) to presume an immediate vesting at the highest rate possible. 
But, according to New York officials, this resulted in "almost unlimited" litigation and 
often much hardship on the preceding life estates. As a result, the statutes were again 
amended in 1911 to call for payment under a temporary order of the lowest tax possible 
[N.Y. Laws (1911) c. 800]. See Oakes, "Development of American State Death Taxes,'' 26 
IOWA L. REv. 451 at 465 (1941); Matter of Parker, 226 N.Y. 260, 123 N.E. 366 (1919). After 
New York finally worked out what it then thought to be the most equitable solution, the 
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rate possible, with a refund allowed if the most taxable con-
tingency does not occur.54 But if the executor requests, the lowest 
possible rate will be determined and paid, and the difference 
between this and the highest tax will held in trust, again with 
current income accruing to the estate.55 
D. Comment. The taxation of contingent remainder interests 
has long been one of the most troublesome problems of the 
inheritance tax approach.56 Certainly the Michigan procedure of 
wait-and-see is outmoded in its adherence to the idea of post-
poning, until possession or enjoyment accrues, the power of 
the state to identify a taxable recipient upon whom it can levy. 
It is inconsistent ·with any sound administrative program for 
implementing revenue legislation. Although the Michigan 
statute could be amended to conform to the Illinois or Ohio 
solutions, perhaps a better answer for all three states lies in the 
estate tax. As a practical matter, an inheritance tax is paid out 
of estate funds before distribution is made to the respective 
beneficiaries, although the amount of the tax is determined by 
the share each receives. When some of the beneficiaries are con-
tingent remaindermen, a tax paid on their share computed at 
the highest possible rate decreases the amount of property left 
for the accompanying life estate. When a security deposit is 
employed, the government bonds required are purchased out 
of the life estate funds. Thus the Illinois and Ohio procedures 
are merely the result of compromise between the interests of 
the state in collecting the full tax due without wasteful expense 
and those of the life tenant in desiring maximum and unre-
stricted enjoyment of his life estate. Neither is fully satisfied, 
for the tax collection methods employed often mean years of 
open files and supervision by probate courts until the remainder 
Ohio legislature in 1919 adopted these ideas completely (see notes 54 and 55 infra, and 
accompanying texts), although Ohio tax officials now consider them unfortunately out-
moded. Tax Dept. Prob. Ct. Bul. No. 13 (May 24, 1955) 3 CCH INHERITANCE, EsrATE AND 
GIFT TAX REP., 7th ed., OHIO, 1[2II0.50. 
54 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §§5731.28, 5731.29. 
55 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.30. The required deposit is HO% of the 
difference between the two taxes. 
56 Cf. Stevens, "The Illinois Inheritance Tax-Explanation and Suggested Improve-
ments," 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 693 at 698, 716-717 (1957); Dexter, "Legal Aspects of the 
Michigan Inheritance and Estate Taxes," PAPERS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF 
GOVT., UNIV. OF MICH. II7 at 150 (1948-49); note 53 supra. 
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vests.57 An estate tax avoids both the theoretical and adminis-
trative difficulties by measuring the tax according to the value 
of the decedent's estate regardless of how it is to be distributed. 
The simplicity of an estate tax, which is unconcerned over who 
the ultimate recipient will be58 and which settles accounts 
between the above competing interests with comparative swift-
ness and finality, ·seems appealing. 
IV. Powers of Appointment 
Under strict property law theories of powers of appointment, 
the appointee's title comes directly from the donor.59 Therefore, 
it should be the appointee who is subject to an inheritance tax 
and not the donee, since the latter never acquires title to the 
property. However, it is often many years after the donor's death 
before the donee designates who the appointee will be. Further, 
the donee might not appoint at all, allowing instead the prop-
erty to pass to the taker-in-default. Since rates and exemptions 
under an inheritance tax are determined by the relationship of 
the recipient to the decedent, property subject to a power of 
appointment creates the same taxation problem found with con-
tingent remainders, i.e., that of determining the recipient at 
the time of the decedent's death. 
Often the appointee is not as closely related to the donor as 
he is to the donee, and the appointee may even feel the inheri-
tance is actually bestowed upon him by the donee since that 
person has the ultimate power over selection of the donor's bene-
ficiaries. Possibly for these reasons New York decided in 1897 to 
treat successions due to an exercise or non-exercise of a power 
as if the donee had bequeathed the property by will. 60 No dis-
57 In cases where the highest tax has been paid, the court may close its files and shift 
to the taxpayer the burden of seeking a redetermination of the tax when the remainder 
vests, a situation which is equally unsatisfactory. 
58 Marital deductions (and filial deductions, if adopted) would not be given for gifts 
of contingent interests. 
59 See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §911 (1956). 
60 N.Y. Laws (1897) c. 284. In 1911, however, New York repealed the provision 
applying to the non-exercise of the power [N.Y. Laws (1911) c. 732], returning the critical 
relationship in instances where the power was not exercised to that of the donor and 
the taker-in-default, analogous to the treatment of contingent remainders. Moreover, 
the 1897 provisions concerning powers apparently would not apply if the donee rejected 
the power (he then has never "acquired" the power), or if the appointee renounced the 
gift. 
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tinction was made between general and special powers. Thus 
the critical relationship, tax-wise, became that of the donee and 
appointee (or taker-in-default). Michigan, Illinois and Ohio 
adopted the 1897 New York amendment but from there went 
their separate ways. 
A. Michigan. The Michigan provision in this area was 
adopted in 1919,61 and, in treating property subject to a power as 
belonging to the estate of the donee, it disregarded an amend-
ment passed by New York in 1911 under which that state returned 
to treating the property as coming from the donor in cases where 
the donee failed to appoint.62 With but one exception, the orig-
inal Michigan approach has survived, and no attempt is made 
to levy a tax at the time of the donor's death. The exception 
was made in 1945 when, in an act dealing with the right of a 
donee to release the power in his lifetime, a provision was inserted 
saying that a release would not be construed as a non-exercise 
of the power under the inheritance tax statutes.63 This must be 
interpreted to mean that, even though the tax is still postponed 
until release, the idea of fictitious ownership by the donee no 
longer applies, and the rates and exemptions are based on the 
relationship between the donor and the taker-in-default. 
B. Illinois. Although Illinois in 1909 also adopted the New 
York provision of 1897, taxing the property as if it had been 
owned by the donee whether or not he exercised the power, a 
problem arose where the donor named a taker-in-default and 
thus created an interest which could be defeated if the donee-
life tenant exercised his power to dispose of the fee. The Illinois 
tax .authorities felt this interest was a transfer dependent upon 
a condition and thus subject, at the donor's death, to immediate 
taxation under the provisions taxing contingent remainders. 
In 1934, however, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention in holding that the transfer to the taker-in-default did 
not occur until the death of the donee, the "owner."64 The 
prospect of this decision must have led to an amendment of the 
Illinois statute one year earlier to conform to the New York 
1911 amendment repealing that part of the powers provisions 
61 MrcH. Pun. Acrs (1919) No. 148, now -Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.20. 
62 See note 60 supra. 
63 Mich. Pub. Acts (1945) No. 296, now Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §556.105. 
64 People v. Linn, 357 Ill. 220, 191 N.E. 450 (1934). 
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dealing with the non-exercise of the power.65 This statutory 
change was interpreted to mean that since the donor-recipient 
relationship would now be looked to if there should be a non-
exercise of the power, the contingent remainder provisions 
allowed the state to assume the power would not be exercised 
and to levy a tax on the remainderman in the manner that would 
produce the highest tax.66 Of course, should the donee exercise 
the power at some later time, the first tax would have to be 
rebated and a new tax levied on the appointee. 
C. Ohio. In its general tax legislation of 1919, Ohio adopted 
the same powers provisions that Michigan and Illinois had 
copied from New York, again without the corresponding New 
York repeal of the portion covering an omission to exercise.67 
And while Ohio does tax contingent remainder interests without 
postponement until vesting, it did not follow Illinois' example 
of later modifying the powers statute to legalize a similar tax 
enforcement program in the two areas. Instead, the Ohio Tax 
Department became worried about the loss of tax revenues 
through administrative non-vigilance in three particular settings 
where, in each, the donor-recipient relationship might still 
become significant many years after the donor's estate had been 
closed. First, the donee might release his power.68 While a 
release might be interpreted as merely another form of failure to 
exercise the power, the Ohio officials are now of the belief that 
the power provisions would be inapplicable here and that the 
donor relationship would control.69 Second, the appointees might 
renounce. Finally, if the donee had a general inter vivos power, 
he might appoint to himself, thus taking title not fictitiously 
from himself under the powers provisions but from the decedent-
donor. Where any of these possibilities exist (and the second 
one will always be present), the Ohio officials feel the tentative 
tax arrangements imposed at the time of the decedent's death 
under the contingent remainder provisions should be applied.70 
65 Ill. Laws (1933) p. 889 at 890. 
66 People v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 369 Ill. 84, 15 N.E. (2d) 729 (1938). 
67 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.02. 
68 Unlike its Michigan counterpart, the Ohio statute allowing a donee to release 
is silent regarding its impact on the inheritance tax statutes. Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 
1958) §1339.16. 
69 Tax Dept. Bui. No. 15 (July 17, 1957) 3 CCH INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX 
REP., 7th ed., Omo, 1[1540.50. 
70 See notes 54 and 55 supra, and accompanying texts. 
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Aware of prior Illinois litigation over this matter,71 and admit-
ting that the tentative payment provisions would be illegal if 
applied as a tax assessment in this setting, it is their position 
that such payments may be demanded on the prospective recip-
ient's share purely as a procedural and security device.72 
Whether this contention will be upheld by the Ohio courts 
remains to be seen. 
D. Comment. Each of the three states has adopted a basic ap-
proach of disregarding common law in the area of powers and of 
creating, for death tax purposes, fictitious title in the donee. This 
approach has merit to the extent the donee controls the course 
of the decedent's gift. 
With regard to tax enforcement, however, the states differ. 
Michigan again takes the wait-and-see approach, and the oppor-
tunities for evading payment of the tax are great.73 In Ohio, tax 
officials would solve the Michigan problem through use of security 
devices, the legality of which has not yet been tested in the courts. 
And Illinois, in an effort to validate its enforcement procedure, 
lost sight altogether of its basic approach in this area when it began 
taxing on the donor-recipient relationship in instances where the 
donee of a general, as well as of a special, power omitted to ap-
point. Certainly, when a general power is given, it is still the 
donee's desires that control the choice of the ultimate recipient of 
the property and it should make no difference tax-wise whether he 
appoints to those who would otherwise take in default or declines 
to appoint and lets the property go to those same individuals. 
Some question might also be raised as to why no overall distinc-
tion is made between general and special powers. 74 While there is 
justifiable reason for cloaking the donee with fictitious title when 
he has a general power, in some instances a special power may re-
strict his freedom of choice so closely that the donor ought to be 
regarded as the one making the gift. The New York and federal 
estate tax provisions recognize this distinction. Property subject 
71 Note 64 supra, and accompanying text. 
72 Note 69 supra. 
73 If the donee exercises an inter vivos power many years before his death and the 
appointee fails to report his gift to the state authorities, it would take constant periodic 
rechecking of open files before the state would discover the evasion. 
74 See People v. Cavenee, 368 Ill. 391, 14 N.E. (2d) 232 (1938). There are no cases in 
Michigan or Ohio on point; but see Dexter, "The Michigan Inheritance Tax-Legal and 
Constitutional Aspects in Light of Other Death Duties," 27 MICH. ST. B. J. 12 at 13 
(August 1948); and see note 69 supra (Ohio). 
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to a power, be it general or special, is included in the donor's gross 
estate. Such property is included in the donee's gross estate, how-
ever, only if his power is general.75 Moreover, while discovery of 
an inter-vivos appointment of a general power may also be diffi-
cult under the estate tax approach, a state would not lose out com-
pletely for it would at least be assured of a tax levy on the donor's 
estate. 
V. Life Insurance Proceeds 
If the proceeds of the decedent's life insurance are made pay-
able to his estate and are so paid, they are a proper subject of tax 
as they will be distributed either by will or intestate succession. 
Moreover, it is generally accepted that if the decedent names a 
beneficiary other than his estate and makes this designation 
irrevocable, the beneficiary's right to the proceeds arises by con-
tract and there is no inheritance taxation. The problem arises 
where the insured names a beneficiary other than the estate but 
reserves the unrestricted right to change this beneficiary. 
A. Michigan. The Michigan legislation is silent on this point, 
and there has been no supreme court decision on the question. 
While the parent New York legislation was similarly silent, the pre-
cise issue was presented to a New York court shortly after Michi-
gan had copied the New York statutes, in a case where the insured 
had changed the beneficiary from his estate to his wife. Holding 
that the assignee under the contract obtained immediate title and 
right to enjoy the insurance proceeds when they became payable, 
even though her title might be later divested by another change 
in beneficiary, the court found no transfer intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after death, and thus there was 
nothing to tax.76 The court went on to say that the state 
"favor[s] and encourage[s] insurance for the benefit of a wife, 
and the state is at a disadvantage when it seeks to tax such a 
· · £ h "77 prov1s10n or er. . . . 
The Michigan law was somewhat clarified in 1909 by an attor-
ney general's opinion agreeing with the New York courts in 
75 LR.C., §2041; 59 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §249-r(7). 
76 Matter of Parsons, 117 App. Div. 321, 102 N.Y.S. 168 (1907). See also Matter of 
Voorhees, 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N.Y.S. 168 (1922). 
77 Matter of Parsons, 117 App. Div. 321 at 323, 102 N.Y.S. 168 (1907). 
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exempting named beneficiaries from the tax.78 Except in instances 
where a trustee was named as beneficiary, 70 this ruling remained 
unchallenged until 1940. At that time, in a case dealing with the 
taxation of proceeds paid to a trustee, a probate court declared in 
dictum that where the policy has a cash surrender value and the 
right to re-designate the beneficiary is retained by the insured, the 
proceeds are subject to tax as a transfer to take effect at death, 
regardless of whether the policies are payable to beneficiaries 
indirectly through the trust or directly from the insurer.80 The 
case never reached the supreme court, possibly because the legis-
lature shortly thereafter added a new provision to the tax statutes 
specifically exempting proceeds of insurance payable to a trustee 
for the benefit of named beneficiaries. 81 This statute might be in-
terpreted as a tacit acceptance of the non-taxability of proceeds 
paid directly to a named beneficiary. Such an interpretation is even 
more reasonable in light of the aforementioned New York decision 
which is in accord. However, a recent Michigan Supreme Court 
decision implies a caveat. In a case holding taxable the proceeds 
paid upon death to a named beneficiary from an employee profit-
sharing plan under which the decedent had the right to change his 
beneficiary, 82 the court said: 
"In addition, we are pressed with the argument that this 
case is analogous to life insurance and the proceeds here 
involved should not be taxed under the act for the same rea-
son that life insurance is not taxed. As to the latter, we will 
only say that we will meet the life insurance case when it 
arises and the instant case will be decided on its mm merits."83 
Some concern is created by this decision over what facts the 
Michigan court will recognize as analogous to the insurance area 
and, indeed, over what the court will say when an actual insurance 
case does present itself. 
B. Illinois. The issue over proper taxation of life insurance 
proceeds in Illinois developed in much the same way as in Michi-
78 MICH. ATIY. GEN. REP. 89 (1909). Accord: MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 332 
(1923-24); ibid. 357. 
79 MICH. ATIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 519 (1937-38). 
so Estate of Purves, Prob. Ct., Oakland County, April 24, 1940, cited in Thompson, 
"Life Insurance Trusts and Taxability of Life Insurance Passing to a Trustee for Named 
Beneficiaries," 19 MICH. ST. B. J. 617 at 619 (1940). 
81 MICH. PUB. ACTS (1941) No. 302, now Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.201. 
82 Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 342 Mich. 195, Record on Appeal, p. 69 (1955). 
83 Smith, J., in In re Brackett Estate, 342 -Mich. 195 at 202, 69 N.W. (2d) 164 (1955). 
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gan, i.e., an interpretation of legislative silence to mean non-
taxation. It is today generally agreed, though without the benefit 
of a state supreme court decision, that the proceeds of the dece-
dent's life insurance are taxable under the Illinois statutes only 
if they are payable to his estate or to his executors or trustees 
for the benefit of his estate. 84 
C. Ohio. The early years of legislative silence in Ohio produced 
a similar interpretation of the issue.85 Any doubt on the question 
was removed in 1931 when the statutes were amended expressly 
to exempt life insurance proceeds payable other than to the 
estate of the insured.86 
D. Comment. When viewed in perspective with other forms 
of transmitting property at death, the purchase of life insurance, 
with the right to change the beneficiary being retained, is merely 
another form of planned apportionment of assets at death, func-
tioning somewhat similar to a will. The estate tax approach 
recognizes this and taxes the proceeds when the decedent retains 
control over the policy during his life.87 A similar procedure 
could as easily be incorporated into inheritance tax statutes. 
Moreover, to the extent that a state policy exists in favor of 
certain beneficiaries, it would not necessarily be frustrated if 
such a procedure would be adopted.88 
VI. Conclusion 
Although several consistent policies will be found in the tax 
provisions of Michigan, Illinois and Ohio, e.g., progressive rates, 
a favoring of the family and charity, and an apparent unwilling-
ness to tax insurance proceeds, the existing divergence of ap-
proach with regard to taxability of certain interests and enforce-
84See CAsn.E, ILLINOIS INHERITANCE TAX MANUAL 17 Gan. 1, 1958); Stevens, "The 
Illinois Inheritance Tax-Explanation and Suggested Improvements," 51 N.W. UNIV. L. 
R.Ev. 693 at 710 (1957). 
85 See 2 Omo ATIY. GEN. OP. 1142 (1919). 
86 114 Omo LAws (1931) p. 94, now Ohio :Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5731.06. 
87 See I.R.C., §2042; 59 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §249-r(9). One variation 
in this area, as applied -by New York, is to exempt such proceeds up to $100,000 while 
subtracting any personal deductions or exemptions allowed to prevent the doubling 
up of •benefits. This exemption is given to all .beneficiaries. Id., §249-q(d). 
ss If the policy of favoring the spouse is the force behind the refusal of the legisla-
ture to bring life insurance proceeds within the tax, this position becomes unnecessary, 
for adequate protection of the spouse could be acquired through use of the marital 
deduction or higher exemptions. 
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ment procedures generally would seem to warrant a fresh look 
at each state's overall death tax program. While a sensible re-
vision of property concepts and some attempt at administrative 
efficiency could be made entirely within the inheritance tax 
framework, 89 enforcement difficulties would still remain in the 
contingent interest and power areas because of the very nature 
of the inheritance tax. Also, each legislature would be required 
to take greater initiative than it has shown in the past in keeping 
the tax up to date. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the above mentioned 
policies are desirable, they can easily be preserved under the 
structure of an estate tax. Moreover, the advantages which can 
be derived from such a tax scheme seem to warrant thorough 
consideration. An estate tax modeled after existing federal law 
would provide the following benefits: (a) ease the burden of 
the estate planner through synchronization of federal and state 
tax provisions so tj.iat the threat of divergent tax consequences 
is minimized,90 (b) provide a state statute with "built-in" case 
law because of the existing comprehensive interpretations of the 
federal provisions, thereby affording the administrator and the 
practitioner certainty and predictability, ( c) eliminate enforcement 
difficulties otherwise inherent in assessing contingent interests, 91 
and ( d) reduce the administrative policing load and cost of 
collection through coordination with federal enforcement. 92 In 
addition, enactment of the estate tax requires little fundamental 
change from the present method of tax assessment.93 
89 See, e.g., Stevens, "The Illinois Inheritance Tax-Explanation and Suggested Im-
provements," 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 693 at 716-718 (1957); Cook, "Federal and Colorado 
Death and Gift Taxes-A Comparison," 35 DICTA 105 at 113 (1958). 
90 E.g., while the federal provisions encourage the use of special powers of appoint-
ment (see note 75 supra), such powers are nevertheless included within the state in-
heritance tax. Although synchronization may not be perfect at all times, for the most 
part the respective laws would be identical. For a discussion of the analogous difficulties 
involved in keeping the New York personal income tax current with federal amendments, 
see Miller, "Proposal for a Federally-Based New York Personal Income Tax," 13 TAX L. 
REv. 183 at 185 (1958). 
91 To the same effect, see ·REPORT, REVENUE LAWS COMMISSION, STATE OF ILLINOIS 
441-445 (1949). 
92 The estate tax scheme has been enjoying a certain amount of recent popularity. 
See, e.g., Savage, "The Proposed Virginia Estate Tax," 44 VA. L. REv. 1009 (1958); Healey, 
"A Proposed Estate Tax for Massachusetts," 26 BoST. BAR BUL. 171 (1955). See also Dexter, 
"Legal Aspects of the Michigan Inheritance and Estate Taxes," PAPERS IN PUBLIC ADMIN-
ISTRATION, BUREAU OF GOVT., UNIV. OF MICH. 117 at 149-153 (1948-49). 
93 Under the estate tax the tax would be calculated on the net estate and the ex-
ecutor could be allowed to assess it pro-rata among the beneficiaries. Compare this with 
884 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
A change to the estate tax, however, would necessitate a 
policy of keeping abreast of federal amendments. Some concern 
may thus arise regarding a surrender of state power to the federal 
government. While it is true that legislative modification in this 
area would usually originate with Congress, it should be clear 
that ultimate control over all state tax provisions would remain 
with each state legislature. Accordingly, the estate tax could be 
supplemented by any local policies which require preservation. 
Since there should be no question regarding the constitution-
ality of an estate tax, 94 since there need be no additional overall 
tax burden on death, 95 and in light of the advantages to be gained 
from a conversion, retention of the inheritance tax demands 
strong justification. 
Edward B. Stulberg, S.Ed. 
the present computation of the inheritance tax according to the amount to be received 
by each beneficiary and, in practice, requiring the executor to pay the total tax out of 
the estate ·before distribution. In fact, one reason for the federal change from the in-
heritance tax to the estate tax in 1916 was to eliminate the necessity of determining the 
relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent. In this respect, see Matter of Hamlin, 
226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919). To the effect that this determination is in many cases 
an unreasonably expensive administrative problem for the state under the Michigan 
inheritance tax, see Schroeder, "Some Aspects of the Administration of the Michigan 
Inheritance Tax Act," MICH. CERT. PUB. Accr. 14 at 18 (Sept. 1956). 
94 See note 1 supra. 
95 The rates, deductions and/or exemptions of an estate tax could be geared to 
raise approximately the same amount of revenue now provided under the inheritance 
tax. 
